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FINAL EXAHI NATION 
ADNIHrSTRATIVE LAH 
First Semes t er 1970-1971 
Hr. Powell 
QUESTION I: 
A suit for declaratory judgment and an injunction to nullify the action 
of the Federal Aviation Administration in letting a contract for instrument 
landing systems Has filed in the US District Court for the District of Colum-
bia by Scanwell Laboratories , Inc. 
The transaction involved resulted from the issuance by Federal Aviation 
Administration of an invitation for bids for instrument landing systems to be 
installed at airports to guide aircraft along a predetermined path to a land-
ing approach. Such systems are designed to make the approach of aircraft to 
airports safer ~ a result of which the FAA sought to attain by carefully cir-
cumscribing the criteria for bids in such a 'f.:lay as to preclude bids from pro-
ducers ,\'ho did not already have an operational system installed and tested in 
at least one location. To this end the invitation for bids provided : 
' :To be responsive to this request, the contractor shall 
submit evidence that identical equipment complement as 
that proposed for this procurement has previously been 
installed in at least one location and has achieved at 
least Category I performance as certified by an FAA 
flight check • • This shall be evidenced by the sub-
mission of a certification from the flight inspection 
source. ,; 
t·Jhen the bids for the instrument landing systems were opened, it l<1aS dis-
covered that Scanwell Laboratories , Inc., \-las the second lowest bid. The low-
est bid was entered by Airborne Instrument Laboratory , a division of Cut1er-
Hammer, Inc. Scam·rell Laboratories , Inc. alleged in its suit that Cut1er-
Hammer v s bid t-Jas not responsive to t he invitation for bids in that Cut1er-
Hammer did not have a system installed in one location , nor did it have a cer-
tificate of performance based on an FAA flight check. Scanwell Laboratories, 
Inc., therefore , sought to ha.ve t he action of the FAA in ' granting the contract 
to the defendant Cutler-Hammer declared null and void as a violation of sta-
tutory provisions controlling government contracts and of regulations promul-
gated thereunder. 
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The Code of Federal Regulations provided : 
l;To be considered for a,,yard 9 a bid must comply in all 
material respects t-7ith the invitation for bids so that , 
both as to the method and timeliness of submission and 
as to the substance of any resulting contracts all 
bidders may stand on an equal footing and the integrity 
of the formal advertising system may be maintained. I i 
The Regulations go on to state that ~ 
I;Any bid which fails to conform to the essential re-
quirements of the invitation for bids 9 such as specifi-
cations, delivery schedule or permissible alternates 
thereto, shall be rejected as nonresponsive. " 
Scam-Tell Laboratories 9 Inc. urged that it can seek review of a contract 
a\"Jard llhich is in violation of the Regulations governing the issuance thereof 
by virtue of Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. also asserted that the action of the FAA in 
granting this contract to an allegedly non-responsive bidder was arbitrary, 
capricious and a violation of the statutory provisions governing contracting, 
and that it can therefore be set aside under Section 10 (e) of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. 
How should the court rule on the issue or issues presented and for what 
reasons? 
QUESTION II: 
Corn Products Company and Derby Foods s Inc. petitioned the US District 
Court for the District of Columbia for review on an order of the Food and Drug 
Administration 9 Department of Health, Education and Uelfare, which established 
a definition and standard of identity for the food product kno,,yu as peanut 
butter. They sought this reviet-T because their products , as they w'ere formu-
lated at the time of the order 9 failed to conform to the standard prescribed 
by FDA. 
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 US C Section 341) contains 
the follel'ling pertinent provision: 
I~Whenever in the judgment of the Secretary such action 
will promote honesty and fair dealing in the interest of 
consumers , he shall promulgate regulations fixing and 
establishing for any food , under its common or usual name 
so far as practicable, a reasonable definition and stan-
dard of identity, a reasonable standard of quality, and/or 
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reasonable standards of fill of container ~ Provided 
In prescribing a definition and standard of identity f ,~~ ­
any food or class of food in ~Jhich optional ingredient .. 
are permitted, t he Secretary shall s for the purposE. C' -'. 
promoting honesty and fair dealing in the interest of 
consumers , designate the optional ingredients which sh~ l~ 
be named on the label. " 
The challenged order was promulgated under Section ~4l of the F '~( :FL' : 
Food > Drug and Cosmetic Ac t . Basically , the order limited the percentcl?':' c ~' 
Height of optional ingredients uh ich migh t be added to the peanut ingred i ,?y,t 
to a maximum of 10%. It allowed for the addition or removal of peanut oi l and 
limited the fat content to 55%. The standard also identified allowable ada l -
tives and specified certain labeling requirements . 
As originally constituted~ peanut butter was composed of ground peanuts s 
salt s and sometimes sugar. However ~ this product had the disadvantages of oil 
separation~ stickiness ~ short-shelf life etc. These deficiencies had been 
diminished 9 if not eliminated , by the addition of stabilizing ingredients and 
hydrogenated vegetable oils. Today ~ peanut butter consists of the peanut in-
gredient ~ which has a solid component and an oil component ~ the stabilizer and 
seasonings. 
Corn Products Company and Derby Foods ~ Inc . are the major producers of 
peanut butter. Each has enjoyed a high degree of s4ccess with its peanut but-
ter product. In 1965 Corn Products ~ the industry leader , claimed 22% of the 
market for its brand ::Skippy. H Derby as the second leading producer had 14% 
of the market from its product "Peter Pan . ,; Their product formulations failed 
to qualify under the nell standard prescribed by FDA in the challenged order 
since each used in excess of 10% of optional ingredients as these are defined 
by the standard . but each for a different reason . 
Both petitioners w~re unsuccessful in urging the Food and Drug Administra-
tion to adopt a standard which would allow 13% of optional ingredients, i.e . 
consist of 87% peanuts. In their suits , Corn Products and Derby urged that the 
adoption of the 90% standard was unreasonable and arbitrary and that the S l'>.::'-
dard would not promote honesty and fair dealing in the interest of consumer~ . 
Corn Products also asserted that the order would result in the taking of its 
property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In addition, the petitioners 
contended that they were entitled to specific findings by FDA as to why their 
products as formulated Here eliminated by the contested order. 
\~at issue or issues are presented and what scope of judicial review should 
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the court afford the petitioners in this case? 
QUESTION III : 
Samuel JacobmoTitz j plaintiff> a non-veteran career employer, ; ,j"' ~:1 :G0T e 
than twenty-two years of government service, filed this suit for ::" C~'~ ':) 3 ;: < ' ~:r ' i'lcnt 
and back pay in the US District Court for the District of Columbi n. ' ,'I' e 
grounds asserted in his complaint Here that his discharge from his P0<;,i j- ; ,C!, as 
a GS - 9 Revenue Officer in the Internal Revenue Service ~.,as procedurnl:!. ; 0, :~­
fective and that the decision removing him Has arbitrary and capricio;Js. 
The material facts ,.,ere these: 
On Hay 6 , 1965, a notice of proposed adverse action v7as issued to the 
plaintiff by the District Director of the Internal Revenue Service at Eacken-
sack, NeH Jersey. This notice contained three charges : 
!:Charge I. Gross Negligence in failing to promptly process 
checks received from taxpayers in violation of 
Sections 1942.52 and 142 . 60 of The Rules of Con-
duct for Internal Revenue Service Employees and 
failure to follow the procedures in the Internal 
Revenue Hanual, Part 5, concerning receipt of 
remittances. 
Charge II. False statements and falsification of records in 
violation of Section 1942.55 of The Rules of Con-
duct for Internal Revenue Employees and failure 
to follow the procedures in the Internal Revenue 
Hanual , Part 5. 
Charge III. Failure to make effective use of time and failure 
to take effective collection action in performance 
of official duties. 11 
The plaintiff made an oral reply to these charges at an informal hearing 
on July 12 , 1965~ in ~vhich he denied all of them. At that time, he offered 
written stat~ents of some persons involved in Charge II. showing that he had 
in fact made the calls on the taxpayers in question and that he had not falsi-
fied the records in this connection. He also asked for a formal hearing and 
requested that all of the taxpayers be produced by subpoena at the hearing and 
before any final decision ~vas made. 
The District Director advised the plaintiff, on August 26, 1965 , Hithout 
any further hearing. that all of the charges and specifications thereunder 
were sustained and plaintiff ~vas dismissed from his position effective Sep-
tember 10, 1965. Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Regional Commissioner 
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of the IRS and requested a hearing. 
The Regional Commissioner granted plaintiff a hearing Hhich 'itr,,, ~Y'! d on 
October 13, 1965 ~ before a Hearing Examiner . The IRS did not [l'C" ,,) ,,1t:. ::,,,? pny of 
the taxpayers as ~!itnesses at the hearing ~ nor anyone who had a::J :'-"' ::: l- sc~.'l1 
kno~1ledge of ~vhether or not the plaintiff made the calls on t he t l1';~r ?-yf':rs as 
stated in his reports and which the IRS contend that he did not make . The only 
,dtnesses of the IRS at the hearing ,,,ere its inspectors y]ho had been s ent out 
to investigate the case by talking to so~e of the taxpayers and others long 
after the calls were reported by plaintiff to have been made. All t he inspec-
tors knew was what someone else told them about plaintiff's not having made the 
calls . 
The IRS introduced in evidence at the hearing the written statements the 
inspectors had obtained from some of the delinquent taxpayers on uhom plaintiff 
said he called , and which statements stated plaintiff had not called on them 
as reported. These statements were introduced over the objection of the plain-
tiff that they were hearsay and denied him the right to cross examination. 
Plaintiff demanded the right to cross examine the absent taxpayers who made the 
statements . 
During the hearing before the Hearing Examiner of the Office of the Re-
gional Commissioner . uhen it became apparent the IRS ,.,as not goin ~ to produce 
the taxpayers as yJitnesses 9 the plaintiff again demanded that they be produced 
and that he be given the right to cross examine them. He requested that the 
hearing be adjourned until this could be done. The IRS objected to the pro-
duction of the taxpayers at the hearing even though they were its ,dtnesses 
and relied on their statements to sustain the charges against the plaintiff. 
It contended that the Examiner did not have the pmver to subpoena them , "Thich 
l.;ras true. The IRS made no shm'iing that the taxpayers had been asked to appear 
as witnesses , or that it had made any effort to have them present or that the 
taxpayers had refused or were unable to be present. The plaintiff, on the 
other hand , tried to produce the taxpayers but succeeded in producing only 
three of the fourteen involved. 
The plaintiff appeared in person at the hearing before the IRS Examiner 
and testified in his own behalf. He denied each and every specification in 
Charges II and III and said they were not true. He testified that he made 
every callan the delinquent taxpayers as shown on his reports . and he intro-
duced into evidence uritten statements of eight of the fourteen taxpayers in-
volved which stated he had infact called on them as reported. Three of the 
taxpayers appeared in person and testified at plaintiffs request that they 
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told the IRS Inspectors plaintiff had called on them . Plaintiff offered in 
evidenc.e a tape recording he had nade of his conversations Hith the remaining 
three taxpayers after the charges had been filed to sho~-1 by t he -'0 ~:_ t:::~ S of the 
taxpayers their admission that he had called on th(:J.'1lc The HearLl? EXallliner 
refused to admit the tape into evidence. and refused to even listen to it be-
fore he rejected it. 
The plaintiff offered to testify that the charges were filed as the result 
of bias and prejudice against him by his superior because he had filed two 
grievance procedures against his superior previously. and had received a 90 
day letter because of it . The Examiner refused this testimony. 
The plaintiff admitted the facts set forth in Charge I~ but said it was a 
frequent occurrence in IRS for checks to get misplaced temporarily and it was 
not a matter of concern to anyone. This was later confirmed by other IRS em-
ployees t]ho testified at the hearing . The plaintiff also testified that his 
group clerk should have found the checks when they were in the files . The late 
cashing of these checks did not cause any loss to anyone. The plaintiff had 
received a reprimand for this occurrence and had thought t !\e D3tter closed until 
the charge '"las filed u 
At the conclusion of the hearing the IRS Hearing Examiner sustained Charge 
I and Charge II but dismissed Charge III . This became the decision of the 
Regional Commissioner of Internal Revenue . 
The plaintiff appealed to the Ne~v York Regional Civil Service Commission 
and a hearing '-1as held Hay 2 ~ 1966. The Commission reversed the IRS decision ~ 
holding that plaintiff should have been allowed to introduce the tape record-
ing and should have been allowed to testify the charges were of a retaliatory 
and descrL~inatory nature . and remanded the case to the IRS for a further 
hearing. 
Both parties appealed to the Board of Appeals and Revievl of the Civil 
Service Commission. The Board decided on September 6$ 1966 9 that the rejection 
of the tape recording and retaliatory evidence was not error and remanded the 
case to the New York Regional Civil Service Commission and ordered it to ad-
judicate the case on its merits. A further hearing was held by the Regional 
Commission on October 1 > 1966. Thereafter the Regional Commission sustained 
Charge I and Charge II and denied plaintiffs appeal. Plaintiff again appealed 
to the Board of Appeals and r..evie't-7 ,.,yhich denied his appeal on February 14, 1967. 
He then appealed to the Civil Service Commission in tvashington which denied 
his appeal on June 8 , 1967. This suit followed. 
Hhat issue or issues are presented in this suit by the plaintiff seeking 
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reinstatement and back pay? HmlT should the court rule upon them and ~.vhy? 
QUESTION IV : 
Easton Publishing Company of Easton s Pennsylvania filed an application 
with the Federal Communications Commission for a license to operate a standard 
broadcasting station in Easton . At or about the same time Allento~~ Broad-
casting Corporation of AllentOlm~ Pennsylvania also filed an application for a 
license to construct and operate a standard broadcasting station in Allentolvu. 
Both stations would have to operate on the same frequency. and . despite 
the fact that neither station would render service to the other community , si-
multaneous operation of two stations would cause mutually destructive inter-
ference. 
The FCC Hearing Examiner who conducted the hearings on the two applica-
tions recommended that the Allentotvu application be granted and the Easton 
application denied. Easton filed exceptions to the recommended decision of 
the Hearing Examiner with the Commission. After oral argument the Commission 
issued its final decision, rejecting the Rearing Examiners recommended decision 
and granting license to Easton Publishing Co . The Commission made detailed 
findings of fact as to the qualifications of the applicants and as to the na-
ture of the communities to be served. Both applicants were found legally and 
technically , financially and otherwise qualified to become licensees ~ both 
communities were found to be in need of programs proposed to be broadcast by 
each applicant. Easton had only one radio broadcasting station whereas Allen-
town had three . The Commission recognized that Allentown was a city of almost 
triple the size of Easton and growing at a faster pace, but FCC found that 
Easton 7 s need for two stations so it would have a choice between locally orig-
inating radio programs was the determining fact. 
On judicial review of the Commission's order awarding the license to 
Easton . Allentown Broadcasting Co. argued that the Commission ' s reversal of 
its Hearing Examiner was erroneous on the ground that the FCC did not have 
authority to overrule its Examiner's findings without l1a very substantial pre-
ponderence of the testimony as recorded to the contrary" and that the Examiner's 
findings could be overruled by FCC only ltlhen they were itclearly erroneous. II 
vlhat disposition should the reviewing court make of this contention of 
Allentown Broadcasting Co., and for tvhat reasons? 
QUESTION V: 
The National Enforcement Commission served simultaneous administrative 
notices on Grand Central Aircraft Co . and on Jonco Aircraft Corporation charging 
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each of them with violations of the Wage Stabilization provisions of the De-
fense Production Act of 1950 ~ and scheduling hearings thereon. Grand Central 
and Jonco were two small business corporations manufacturing aircraft parts. 
In that posture of the administrative proceedings, the tlvO aircraft manu-
facturers filed separate suits in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia to enjoin further administrative action and hearings on 
these charges by the Commission to determine their guilt of the violations 
asserted~ until after these suits had been heard and adjudicated on the merits 
by the Court. In their respective suits the aircraft manufacturers alleged ~ 
1 . The conduct of the proposed administrative hearings 
would cause irreparable damage by cutting off their 
bank credit and depriving them of essential vlOrking 
capital. 
2 . The Defense Production Act of 1950 did not authorize 
the National Enforcement Commission to institute such 
administrative proceedings for the enforcement of the 
{>lage Stabilization provisions. 
The District Court consolidated the two cases for hearing since the issues 
.'involved ~vere identical. 
In their respective verified complaints the t,vo Aircraft companies alleged 
that the administrative proceeding itself would cause irreparable injury by 
cutting off their bank credit. thereby depriving them of essential tvorking 
capital ~ regardless of the outcome on judicial revie~" of the administrative 
proceeding . because : (1) If the National Enforcement Commission should find 
a violation it would certify to all government agencies including the Internal 
Revenue Tax Service for income tax purposes , the disallowance of all illegal 
wage payments found by it to have been made, which would disqualify such l~age 
payments as a business expense for income tax purposes, thereby so substantially 
increasing the Companysi income tax liability as to render them insolvent. The 
alleged amount of excess wage payments involved was $5,000,000 for one of the 
companies and $7 . 500 . 000 for the other company. (2) The Banks involved l.Jould 
be allerted to this possibility by the holding of the Commission hearings and 
t-lOuld immediately call their loans and refuse additional vlorking capital loans 
to these two ComFanies ~lhich would result in their insolvency and termination 
of their operations. 
Counsel for the National Enforcement Commission filed a motion to dismiss 
these complaints, thereby admitting for purposes of the motion the truth of all 
of the factual allegations contained in the complaints. 
HOv1 should the Court rule upon the motions to dismiss and for what reasons? 
F.Nn 
